Randomized controlled clinical trials play an important role in the development of new medical therapies. There is, however, an ethical issue surrounding the use of randomized treatment allocation when the patient is suffering from a life threatening condition and requires immediate treatment. Such patients can only benefit from the treatment they actually receive and not from the alternative therapy, even if it ultimately proves to be superior. We discuss a novel new way to analyse data from such clinical trials based (...) on the use of the recently developed theory of imprecise probabilities. This work draws an explicit distinction between the related but nevertheless distinct questions of inference and decision in clinical trials. The traditional question of scientific interest asks 'Which treatment offers the greater chance of success?' and is the primary reason for conducting the clinical trial. The question of decision concerns the welfare of the patients in the clinical trial, asking whether the accumulated evidence favours one treatment over the other to such an extent that the next patient should decline randomization and instead express a preference for one treatment. Consideration of the decision question within the framework of imprecise probabilities leads to a mathematical definition of equipoise and a method for governing the randomization protocol of a clinical trial. This paper describes in detail the protocol for the conduct of clinical trials based on this new method of analysis, which is illustrated in a retrospective analysis of data from a clinical trial comparing the anti-emetic drugs ondansetron and droperidol in the treatment of postoperative nausea and vomiting. The proposed methodology is compared quantitatively using computer simulation studies with conventional clinical trial designs and is shown to maintain high statistical power with reduced sample sizes, at the expense of a high type I error rate that we argue is irrelevant in some specific circumstances. Particular emphasis is placed on describing the type of medical conditions and treatment comparisons where the new methodology is expected to provide the greatest benefit. (shrink)

As digital technology advances at a truly exponential rate, documentary filmmakers may be tempted to bypass standards of ethical conduct – like subject consent and disclosure of contrived reenactments to audiences – in favor of dramatic impact. Some may also seek to replace missing archival or historical material and manufacture seemingly authentic content with the assistance of “digital performers.” This commentary examines the use of artificial intelligence in Morgan Neville’s film, Roadrunner: A Film About Anthony Bourdain and places it within (...) an historical context. Comparisons to Flaherty’s Nanook of the North and Kosinski’s Top Gun: Maverick highlight the importance of managing and negotiating traditional audience expectations in order to preserve the unspoken agreement between viewers and makers. (shrink)

Fiction. Although this story contains a measure of historical accuracy, any resemblance between the central character and a real person, or between the events of the story and real events, is entirely coincidental. The main purpose of this piece is to expand upon the notion of overload as one reason business people should not be burdened with moral responsibility. The overload argument is presented in a chapter of Business Ethics in Canada, edited by Deborah Poff and Wilfrid Waluchow (Prentice-Hall of (...) Canada, 1987). In this chapter, Moral Responsibility in Business or Fourteen Ways to Pass the Buck, Alex C. Michalos both presents and replies to the overload argument. This short story is presented as an alternative to his reply. (shrink)

Metaphysics and language: Quine, W. V. O. On the individuation of attributes. Körner, S. On some relations between logic and metaphysics. Marcus, R. B. Does the principle of substitutivity rest on a mistake? Van Fraassen, B. C. Platonism's pyrrhic victory. Martin, R. M. On some prepositional relations. Kearns, J. T. Sentences and propositions.--Basic and combinatorial logic: Orgass, R. J. Extended basic logic and ordinal numbers. Curry, H. B. Representation of Markov algorithms by combinators.--Implication and consistency: Anderson, A. R. Fitch (...) on consistency. Belnap, N. D., Jr. Grammatical propaedeutic. Thomason, R. H. Decidability in the logic of conditionals. Myhill, J. Levels of implication.--Deontic, epistemic, and erotetic logic: Bacon, J. Belief as relative knowledge. Wu, K. J. Believing and disbelieving. Kordig, C. R. Relativized deontic modalities. Harrah, D. A system for erotetic sentences. (shrink)

A system of natural deduction rules is proposed for an idealized form of English. The rules presuppose a sharp distinction between proper names and such expressions as the c, a (an) c, some c, any c, and every c, where c represents a common noun. These latter expressions are called quantifiers, and other expressions of the form that c or that c itself, are called quantified terms. Introduction and elimination rules are presented for any, every, some, a (an), and the, (...) and also for any which, every which, and so on, as well as rules for some other concepts. One outcome of these rules is that Every man loves some woman is implied by, but does not imply, Some woman is loved by every man, since the latter is taken to mean the same as Some woman is loved by all men. Also, Jack knows which woman came is implied by Some woman is known by Jack to have come, but not by Jack knows that some woman came. (shrink)

Historical language change (), like evolution itself, is a fact; and its implications for the biological evolution of the human capacity for language acquisition () have been ably explored by many contemporary theorists. However, Christiansen & Chater's (C&C's) revolutionary call for a replacement of phylogenetic models with glossogenetic cultural models is based on an inadequate understanding of either. The solution to their lies before their eyes, but they mistakenly reject it due to a supposed Gene/;culture co-evolution poses a series of (...) difficult theoretical and empirical problems that will be resolved by subtle thinking, adequate models, and careful cross-disciplinary research, not by oversimplified manifestos. (shrink)

I have argued that without an adequate solution to the knower paradox Fitch's Proof is- or at least ought to be-ineffective against verificationism. Of course, in order to follow my suggestion verificationists must maintain that there is currently no adequate solution to the knower paradox, and that the paradox continues to provide prima facie evidence of inconsistent knowledge. By my lights, any glimpse at the literature on paradoxes offers strong support for the first thesis, and any honest, non-dogmatic reflection (...) on the knower paradox provides strong support for the second. Whether verificationists want to go the route I've suggested is not for me todecide. As in the previous section my aim has been that of defending the mere viability of verificationism in the face of what many, many philosophers have taken to be its death-knell, namely Fitch's Proof. But, as the final objection makes clear, showing that verificationism can live in the face of Fitch's Proof is one thing; showing that it should live is another project. If nothing else, I hope that this papershows that verificationists still have a project to pursue; Fitch's Proof, contrary to popular opinion, need not bury verificationism.13. (shrink)

Addresses the question of why we find Fitch's knowability 'paradox' argument surprising.

I argue that Fitch’s ‘paradox of knowability’ presents no special problem for the epistemic anti-realist who believes that reality is epistemically accessible to us. For the claim which is the target of the argument (If p then it is possible to know p) is not a commitment of anti-realism. The epistemic anti-realist’s commitment is (or should be) to the recognizability of the states of affairs which render true propositions true, not to the knowability of the propositions themselves. A formal (...) apparatus for discussing the recognizability of states of affairs is offered, and other prima facie similar approaches to the paradox argument are reviewed. (shrink)

A system of logic usually comprises a language for which a model-theory and a proof-theory are defined. The model-theory defines the semantic notion of model-theoretic logical consequence (⊨), while the proof-theory defines the proof- theoretic notion of logical consequence (or logical derivability, ⊢). If the system in question is sound and complete, then the two notions of logical consequence are extensionally equivalent. The concept of full formalization is a more restrictive one and requires in addition the preservation of the standard (...) meanings of the logical terms in all the admissible interpretations of the logical calculus, as it is proof-theoretically defined. Although classical first-order logic is sound and complete, its standard formalizations fall short to be full formalizations since they allow non-intended interpretations. This fact poses a challenge for the logical inferentialism program, whose main tenet is that the meanings of the logical terms are uniquely determined by the formal axioms or rules of inference that govern their use in a logical calculus, i.e., logical inferentialism requires a categorical calculus. This paper is the first part of a more elaborated study which will analyze the categoricity problem from its beginning until the most recent approaches. I will first start by describing the problem of a full formalization in the general framework in which Carnap (1934/1937, 1943) formulated it for classical logic. Then, in sections IV and V, I shall discuss the way in which the mathematicians B.A. Bernstein (1932) and E.V. Huntington (1933) have previously formulated and analyzed it in algebraic terms for propositional logic and, finally, I shall discuss some critical reactions Nagel (1943), Hempel (1943), Fitch (1944), and Church (1944) formulated to these approaches. (shrink)

Professor Fitch carefully guides the reader through the first and second chapters demonstrating how theorems of a sentential logic are truths about so-called Q-functions. These Q-functions are given by presenting symbols for twelve basic functions, specifying that finite combinations of these basic symbols give Q-functions, and by giving rules for the introduction of basic symbols into, and the elimination of basic symbols from, combinations of these symbols. The combinators are the basic symbols which are not symbols for "and," "or," (...) "not," and "equals." Truths about Q-functions are the basic and derived introduction and elimination rules. To familiarize readers with introduction and elimination rules, he devotes an introductory chapter to a review of his method of subordinate proof which is used throughout the book. This review is also valuable for stressing the differences between his sentential logic and classical logic on one hand and intuitionistic logic on the other. Rejecting the law of excluded middle he nevertheless maintains double negation. (shrink)

Martin presents fifteen previously unpublished essays which he wrote before 1973. Despite several references to his earlier books such as Truth and Denotation, these essays will be intelligible to those who have not yet read anything by R. M. Martin as long as you can master long formulations in the notation of a formal first-order language. Indeed, these essays can serve as an introduction to the work of Martin. The first three essays present Martin's metaphysical system. Essays 4, 5, and (...) 6 amplify his system by showing how a wide variety of sentences can have their logical form represented in the formal language which displays Martin's ontology. In the remaining nine essays he critically evaluates positions of other philosophers such as Hiz, Carnap, Quine, Fitch, Chisholm, Popper, Sellars, Heyting, Lorenzen, and Putnam, from the perspective of his system. Because his systematic approach unifies all of the papers and because he uses technical terms in the development of his system, it is regrettable that the book offers no index. (shrink)

These sixteen essays were written in honor of Frederick B. Fitch. Each part of the volume treats an area of the logical enterprise which had special interest for Fitch. The four parts are entitled, respectively, "Metaphysics and Language," "Basic and Combinatorial Logic," "Implication and Consistency," and "Deontic, Epistemic, and Erotetic Logic.".